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Abstract: 
 
A study tested the effects of mirror-induced self-focus on participants’ tendency to self-
stereotype. Americans high and low in identification with their nationality rated themselves and 
the group “Americans” on traits that varied in stereotypicality and valence. Participants made 
these ratings under one of three conditions: (1) while facing a mirror, (2) while facing a mirror 
with an American flag visible, and (3) while not facing a mirror. High identifiers were more 
likely to endorse stereotypic traits and to rate themselves as similar to their national group when 
self-focused. In contrast, low identifiers were less likely to endorse stereotypic traits and to rate 
themselves as similar to their national group when self-focused. These patterns were limited to 
traits negative in valence. Correlational analyses indicated that self/group ratings were most 
similar when high identifiers were self-focused. Implications for the distinction between personal 
and social identity are discussed.  
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Article: 
 
The distinction between self-definitions that are personal and individuating and those that 
are shared and collective is popular among psychologists (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; 
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Triandis, 1989; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Self-definition that differentiates the self from other individuals is 
thought to reflect personal identity, whereas self-definition that is shared with others and derived 
from group memberships is typically considered to reflect social identity. Many who endorse this 
distinction assume or assert that these constructs are largely distinct and independent (e.g., 
Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; cf. Deaux, 
1992). Self-categorization theorists have been most explicit in making this point, and argue that 
these two levels of self-definition oppose one another and as such are functionally antagonistic 
(Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).  
 
Recent empirical evidence supports this contention. Mullen, Migdal, and Rozell (2003) 
measured the ethnic social identity of participants under different experimental conditions. Some 
participants completed dependent measures while self-focused (while sitting in front of a mirror); 
others completed dependent measures under normal conditions (i.e., not in front of a mirror). 
Research indicates that self-focus – and mirrors in particular – increase individuation and the 
salience of personal identity (e.g., Davis & Brock, 1975; Ickes, Layden, & Barnes, 1978). In the 
research of Mullen and colleagues, the presence of a mirror significantly increased participants’ 
personal self-focus but simultaneously decreased the salience and importance of ethnic social 
identity compared to those who were not in the presence of a mirror. These researchers 
concluded that increased personal identity salience (via mirror-induced self-focus) precluded the 
salience of participants’ ethnic identity (see also Abrams, 1994).  
 
One problem with the antagonism perspective concerns those who identify with and care 
about their social identifications. Those for whom group membership is central and self-defining 
are likely to have accepted and internalized the characteristics of the social group. Indeed, 
internalization of a social identification is thought to be necessary in order for group behavior to 
occur (Ellemers, Spears, & Doojse, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Rather than oppose personal 
identity, those highly identified with their social groups may have social identities that 
compliment, extend, and are built on top of the personal self (see Simon & Kampmeier, 2001, for 
a related argument). It is noteworthy that the most common ethnic identity of participants in 
Mullen et al.’s study was Caucasian/White, an ethnicity unlikely to have much importance 
attached to it (Nario-Redmund, Biernat, Eidelman, & Palenske, 2004). Because low identifiers 
are unlikely to internalize group characteristics as their own, and because self-focus has been 
found to offset the effects of incongruent self-aspects (e.g., Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, Hormuth, 
1979), it is reasonable to expect self-focus to keep low identifiers from defining themselves in 
group-consistent ways. Had participants in Mullen et al.’s study considered their ethnicity to be 
an important aspect of who they were, we might expect increased ethnic identification among 
those who were self-focused. 
 
 We suggest that there is substantial overlap between personal and social identity for those 
who attach importance to their ingroups, and that factors increasing the salience of one are likely 
to simultaneously increase the salience of the other. To test this contention, we manipulated the 
self-focus of Americans who were high and low in identification with their nationality and then 
provided an opportunity for them to self-stereotype, an indicator of social identity salience. 
According to self-categorization theory, when group membership becomes salient, a perceptual 
shift in identity occurs whereby individuals take on group attributes as their own; i.e., they self-
stereotype (Turner et al., 1987; see also Brown and Turner, 1981). Self-perception is thought to 
become depersonalized as individuals perceive themselves as sharing characteristics believed to 
be typical of the group and its members. Many experimental manipulations of group salience 
have been shown to increase self-stereotyping, including the demands of an experimenter (Hogg 
& Turner, 1987), minority status (Simon & Hamilton, 1994), and distinctiveness within the 
group (Biernat, Crandall, Young, Kobrynowicz, & Halpin, 1998). In our study, we assumed the 
self-regulatory aspects of self-focus would motivate those highly identified with their nationality 
to self-stereotype as a means of moving the self closer to this salient standard. At the same time, 
we expected self-focus to motivate those low in identification to move the self away from this 
standard that, though salient, was not self-consistent.  
 
Self-stereotyping has been operationalized in many ways, including endorsement of traits 
stereotypic of the ingroup (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 
2002; Simon & Hamilton, 1994) and similarity to the ingroup and its members (e.g., Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994; Spears, Doojse, & Ellemers, 1997). In our research, we measured self-
stereotyping both ways. We also looked at the relationship between participants’ self ratings and 
ratings of their national group as a gauge of how closely participants’ sense of self was tied to 
this identity (Biernat et al., 1996).  
 
 We exposed participants to a large American flag before they were seated in front of a 
large mirror that either had the reflective side facing participants or the wall. Participants were 
pre-selected to be high or low in their identification as an American, and we assumed that the 
sight of a national symbol would increase awareness of this social identity for both groups. We 
also expected participants who faced the mirror to become self-focused, a manipulation known to 
increase personal identity salience (Ickes et al., 1978; Mullen et al., 2003). Because some argue 
that mirrors might be particularly adept at undermining the salience of social identity (Abrams, 
1994), we added a third condition as a safeguard in our study. In this condition, we hoped to 
simultaneously heighten participants’ personal and social identity by having them sit in front of a 
mirror with a large American flag behind them so that their reflection was imposed over the flag. 
All participants were then given the opportunity to self-stereotype by endorsing traits pre-
selected to be stereotypic of the group Americans and by matching their trait ratings to those of 
the group Americans.   
 
Because those high in national identity are likely to have internalized group 
characteristics as their own, we expected significant overlap between this social identity and 
personal identity when self-focus was high. This is because self-focus motivates the self to 
regulate by reducing inconsistency between self and salient standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; 
Gibbons, 1978; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Wicklund, 1975). With their national identity made 
salient, we predicted that self-focus would lead to greater self-stereotyping for high identifiers 
compared to when not self-focused, and regardless of whether an identity cue (an American flag) 
remained visible. Because low identifiers are unlikely to have internalized group characteristics 
as their own, the salience of national identity should be incongruent with how they typically see 
themselves. And because self-focus is known to offset the effects of incongruent self aspects 
(Gibbons et al., 1979), we predicted less self-stereotyping for low identifiers in the presence of a 
mirror (i.e., when self-focused) than when not. In terms of trait endorsement, changes in self-
definition should be limited to endorsement of stereotypic traits; we expected our experimental 
and quasi-experimental variables to only affect traits associated with the group Americans. When 
self-stereotyping was operationalized as similarity to the group, we did not expect the 
stereotypicality of traits to matter (participants should see themselves as closer to the group 
regardless of the relationship of the trait to the group stereotype). Because previous research has 
sometimes found (e.g., Biernat et al., 1996) and other times not found (e.g., Pickett et al., 2002; 
Simon & Hamilton, 1994) endorsement of negative self-stereotypes, we also investigated trait 
valence as a potential moderating variable. As a final operationalization of self-stereotyping, we 
also considered the covariation between endorsement of personal and group traits. We expected 
this relationship to be strongest when high identifiers were self-focused.   
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
 
 Eighty-five University of Kansas undergraduates (41% female) were recruited based on a 
measure administered during a prescreening session held early in the semester. In this session, 
participants indicated their nationality and then indicated the extent to which they identified with 
this group using a single item with response options that varied from1 (not at all important to 
who I am) to 7 (very important to who I am) scale. Only Americans who indicated being highly 
identified (those who reported values greater than 5, n = 50) or not highly identified (those who 
reported values less than 3, n = 35) were recruited. These two groups of participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three self-focus conditions, described below.    
 
Procedure 
 
 Participants meeting the above criteria were contacted by phone and scheduled for 
individual sessions. When they arrived, participants were shown to a small room with a chair and 
desk, upon which sat some boxes and a large (76 × 122 cm) mirror. In addition, a large American 
flag (approximately 91 × 152 cm) hung length-wise from the wall opposite the furniture and 
mirror. Taped signs indicated that the items were part of another experiment and admonished 
participants to not disturb them. The experimenter acted annoyed and apologized for the mess. 
She went on to explain that the room was usually used by another researcher and invited the 
participant to sit at the desk. Depending on experimental condition, the reflective side of the 
mirror either faced toward or away from the participant. Because the flag was clearly visible 
when participants entered the room, we expected this social identity to become salient in all 
conditions.1  
 
After giving informed consent, participants were told that the study was about how 
people think of themselves and various groups. The experimenter then left the participant alone 
to work on a questionnaire packet containing the study’s dependent measures (described below). 
Before leaving the room, the experimenter again apologized for the mess and offered to get some 
things out of the participant’s way. Specifically, the experimenter took some boxes from the 
table and – in one of three conditions – took down and removed the American flag. In all 
conditions, the mirror – turned toward or away from participants – was left behind. Removal of 
the flag and placement of the mirror combined to form three experimental conditions of self-
focus. In the no mirror condition, the reflective side of the mirror was turned away from 
participants. Though the flag remained on the wall, participants could not see it or themselves 
while they worked on their packets. In the mirror condition, the reflective side of the mirror 
faced participants, but because the experimenter removed the flag from the wall before leaving 
the room, participants only saw themselves while working on their packet. The reflective side of 
the mirror also faced participants in the mirror/flag condition but because the flag remained on 
the wall, participants could see themselves imposed over the flag (which took up most of the 
reflection in the mirror) while completing their packet. We considered self-focus to be absent in 
the first (no mirror) condition and present in the second (mirror) and third (mirror/flag) 
condition.  
 
Dependent Measures. Participants were instructed to rate themselves along 20 traits 
carefully selected based on extensive pre-testing. Two of these traits, industrious and pleasure-
loving, were rated by an independent sample of 18 University of Kansas students as typical of 
Americans (above 7 on a 9-point scale) and positive in valence (above 6 on a 9-point scale). 
Another two traits, aggressive and materialistic, were also rated as stereotypic of Americans but 
negative in valence (below 4 on a 9-point scale). Two positively-valenced control traits, 
adaptable and neat, differed from the positive stereotypic words in the extent to which they 
characterized Americans (p < .05) but did not differ from these same traits in valence. Similarly, 
two negatively-valenced control words, callous and gullible, differed from the negative 
stereotypic traits in the extent to which they were thought to characterize Americans (p < .05) but 
not in valence. Responses to positive and negative stereotypic and control traits were averaged to 
form a positive stereotype index, a negative stereotype index, a positive control index, and a 
negative control index, depending on the pair of traits in question. Comparison of these indexes 
allowed us to operationalize self-stereotyping as the differential personal endorsement of positive 
and negative traits stereotypic of the group Americans and to compare these ratings with traits 
unrelated to the group stereotype (e.g., Biernat et al., 1996; Pickett et al., 2002; Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994). Twelve additional traits, eight positive (compassionate, conscientious, ethical, 
reliable, sympathetic, tactful, truthful, and warm) and four negative (forceful, jealous, moody, 
and secretive) were also rated (these traits were not selected based on the extent to which they 
were rated as typical of Americans). Traits were listed alphabetically, and participants rated 
themselves using a 1 (never or almost never true of me) to 7 (always or almost always true of 
me) scale. 
 
Participants then rated all 20 traits again. This time, participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which each trait characterized the group Americans along a 7-point rating scale (1 = 
never or almost never true of Americans; 7 = always or almost always true of Americans). To 
determine the degree of similarity between participants’ self ratings and ratings of the group 
Americans, we subtracted the former from the latter. Computed in this way, values closer to zero 
indicated more similarity to the group Americans and positive values indicated that the trait was 
more characteristic of Americans than the self. We then combined these values for the positive 
and negative traits separately to form a positive similarity index (α = .72) and a negative 
similarity index (α = .61). These indexes allowed us to operationalize self-stereotyping a second 
way, as the degree of similarity between participants’ self ratings and their ratings of the group 
Americans across positive and negative traits (e.g., Hardie & McMurray, 1992; Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994; Spears et al., 1997). We also compared the relationship between self and group 
ratings for low and high identifiers who were self-focused and not self-focused as a third way of 
operationalizing self-stereotyping (see Biernat et al., 1996, and Gibbons, 1978, for conceptual 
and methodological precedents, respectively).  
 
After answering some demographic items and exploratory measures, participants were 
thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.  
 
 
Results 
 
Data Analysis Strategy  
 
To test whether self-focus and identification level affected participants’ propensity to 
self-stereotype, we first used multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) procedures to 
compare responses across measures. We followed these procedures with univariate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and planned contrasts. We also computed correlations between the sum of 
self and group trait ratings within each level of identification and self-focus.    
 
Trait Endorsement 
 
To test the hypothesis that high identifiers would endorse stereotypic traits more and low 
identifiers would endorse stereotypic traits less when self-focused, a 3 (self-focus: mirror, 
mirror/flag, or no mirror) × 2 (identification level: high or low) MANOVA was computed across 
the four measures of trait endorsement (i.e., the positive stereotype index, negative stereotype 
index, positive control index, and the negative control index). This analysis produced no main 
effects but did indicate a marginal multivariate interaction, Wilks's λ = .83, F(8, 152) = 1.78,  p < 
.09. Consistent with predictions, univariate analyses indicated a significant Self-Focus × 
Identification Level interaction on the negative stereotype index, F(2, 79) = 5.07, p < .009, η2 = 
.11 (see Figure 1). High identifiers endorsed negative stereotypic traits as more self descriptive in 
the mirror (M = 3.90, SD = 1.05) and mirror/flag (M = 3.77, SD = .75) conditions than the no 
mirror condition (M = 3.25, SD = .91), contrast p < .04. In contrast, low identifiers reported less 
stereotypic traits in the mirror (M = 3.26, SD = .92) and mirror/flag (M = 3.37, SD = 1.02) 
conditions compared to the no mirror condition (M = 4.10, SD = .65), contrast p < .03.  
 
 
Figure 1. Endorsement of negative stereotypic traits as a function of self-focus and identification 
level. 
 
No significant effects emerged on the positive stereotype index or negative control index 
(all Fs < 1). Only a main effect for identification level emerged on the positive control index, 
F(1,79) = 4.00, p < .05, η2 = .04, indicating that high identifiers (M = 5.28, SD = .97) endorsed 
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positive traits not typical of the ingroup more than low identifiers (M = 4.77, SD = 1.21). No 
other effects on the positive control index were significant.  
 
Similarity to the Group 
 
To test the hypothesis that self-focus would cause high identifiers to rate themselves as 
more similar to Americans and low identifiers to rate themselves as less similar to Americans, a 
3 (self-focus: mirror, mirror/flag, or no mirror) × 2 (identification level: high or low) MANOVA 
was computed across the two measures of similarity (the positive similarity index and the 
negative similarity index). This analysis produced no main effects but did indicate a significant 
multivariate interaction, Wilks's λ = .88, F(4, 156) = 2.47, p < .05. Univariate tests indicated a 
significant Self-Focus × Identification Level interaction on the negative similarity index, F(2,79) 
= 4.08, p < .03, η2 = .09 (see Figure 2). Highly identified Americans self-stereotyped by 
indicating that they were more similar to Americans on negative traits characteristic of this group 
in the mirror (M = 1.30, SD = .62) and mirror/flag (M = 1.37, SD = .78) conditions compared to 
the no mirror condition (M = 1.79, SD = .96), contrast p < .09. Low-identifying Americans, in 
contrast, indicated that they were more similar to Americans on the same negative traits in the no 
mirror condition (M = 1.01, SD = .87) compared to the mirror (M = 1.76, SD = .90) and 
mirror/flag (M = 1.77, SD = 1.13) conditions, contrast p < .03.  
 
 
Figure 2. Similarity between self and group on negative traits as a function of self-focus and 
identification level.  
Note: Lower numbers = more self-group similarity.   
 
Neither the main effects nor the interaction between self-focus and identification level 
was significant on the positive similarity index, all Fs < 1.  
 
Correlations 
 
   To determine whether the relationship between self and group ratings was affected by 
our independent and quasi-independent variables, we averaged participants’ self and group 
ratings for all traits and then computed correlations between these values within self-focus 
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(mirror and mirror/flag) and no self-focus (no mirror) conditions separately for low and high 
identifiers (see Table 1). Consistent with predictions, this (positive) relationship was only 
significant for high identifiers who were self-focused (p < .03; all other ps > .63). Moreover, the 
strength of this relationship tended to be greater for high identifiers who were self-focused than 
high identifiers who were not self-focused and low identifiers who were self-focused, both zs > 
1.11, ps = .13.  
 
Table 1. Correlations between averaged self and group ratings by self-focus and identification 
level 
 Condition 
 Self-Focused Not Self-Focused 
High Identifiers .38* .04 
Low Identifiers .09 .07 
Notes: Mirror and mirror/flag conditions were collapsed into the self-focused condition. 
* p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Though some argue that personal and social identity might oppose one another (Mullen et 
al., 2003; Turner et al., 1987), our data suggest otherwise for those highly identified with their 
nationality. When self-focused, highly identified Americans were more likely to endorse 
negative stereotypic traits as self-defining, and to rate themselves as more similar to other 
Americans, compared to highly identified Americans who were not self-focused. Because 
mirror-induced self-focus is particularly individuating (Davis & Brock, 1975; Ickes et al., 1978; 
Mullen et al., 2003) and self-stereotyping is an indicator of social identity salience (Turner et al., 
1987), it seems that personal identity salience and social identity salience were co-present for the 
self-focused, highly identified Americans in our sample. This is not surprising if we assume that 
those who place a premium on their group identity are likely to have internalized this self-
definition. That the opposite pattern occurred for low identifying Americans – self-focus 
decreased self-stereotyping – also supports our thinking about the relationship between personal 
and social identity. Because these individuals are unlikely to have accepted group characteristics 
as their own, self-focus (and the individuation it leads to) should override any superficial 
assimilation to the group that its initial salience would be likely to have evoked (e.g., Gibbons et 
al., 1979).  
 
 These patterns were limited to traits negative in valence; positive stereotypic traits were 
not endorsed more due to self-focus or participants’ level of identification with their nationality, 
nor did participants tend to match their self-ratings on positive traits with those of the ingroup 
(although correlational data indicated that, irrespective of trait valence, self/group ratings were 
more closely related when high indentifiers were self focused). Others have also found that trait 
valence moderated self-stereotyping, but in this case self-stereotyping only occurred for positive 
traits (Biernat at al., 1996). Though we have no ready explanation for this inconsistency, we 
speculate that self-enhancement motives are relevant. Both low and high identifiers may have 
been eager to accept positive traits as self-defining, even those stereotypic of the ingroup. 
Similarly, it is likely that neither high nor low identifiers wished to endorse negative traits, and in 
particular, negative stereotypic traits made relevant by the presence of an American flag. Indeed, 
inspection of cell means indicates that when not self-focused, highly identified Americans tended 
to distance themselves from the group stereotype more than did those low in identification. 
Because self-focus motivates comparison between salient standards and behavior (Duval & 
Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), only high identifiers would have experienced conflict 
between self-enhancement and endorsement of traits relevant to the ingroup (e.g., Swann, 1987). 
Because high and low identifiers differ in the importance placed on their nationality, comparison 
with this salient standard invoked by self-focus led to different self-definitional responses. Those 
low in identification were able to distance themselves from this unimportant reference group (cf. 
Carver & Humphries, 1981), whereas high identifiers accepted the unfavorable aspects of being 
American. We also note that although self-focus did not increase self-stereotyping on positive 
traits for high identifiers, neither did it decrease it (as would be predicted by other perspectives; 
cf. Mullen et al., 2003; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994).   
 
Self-Focus and Self-Regulation 
 
Self-focus leads people to compare self with salient standards, and behavior is then 
adjusted to more closely conform to this standard. Heightened self-focus, in other words, 
promotes self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). Many studies demonstrate the power 
of self-focus to regulate behavior in this way (e.g., Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979; 
Carver, 1975; Gibbons, 1978). Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1998) recently showed the 
applicability of such a process to category-based judgment of others; self-focus led to less social 
stereotyping among those who thought it was unacceptable to stereotype others, but more social 
stereotyping among those who thought it was acceptable. Our own data show a similar process 
for stereotyping of the self; self-focus led to more self-stereotyping among those high in 
identification with their group but less self-stereotyping among those low in identification. 
Should a group seek to instigate self-regulation among its members, obstacles must be overcome 
(Wicklund, 1982). Self regulation is at base a matter of changing the self, but how the self 
changes will depend on who the self is and the nature of the standard in question. 
 
Content and Process in Personal and Social Identifications 
 
We are not the first to suggest overlap between personal and social identifications. Others 
have argued that the same characteristic (e.g., being a vegetarian or wearing glasses) may 
differentiate the self from other individuals (personal identity) or be shared socially (social 
identity) depending on context (Simon, 1997; Turner et al., 1994). Recently this point was 
demonstrated by Pickett and her colleagues (Pickett et al., 2002), who found that heightened 
needs for assimilation and differentiation increased self-stereotyping among members of 
relatively distinct groups (e.g., honors students, sorority members). Presumably, the 
distinctiveness of these groups allowed participants to be the same (similar to other group 
members) and different (distinct from those in other groups) at the same time (Brewer, 1991). 
Also related, Simon and colleagues (1997; Simon & Kampmeier, 2001) have suggested that 
whether personal or social identity becomes operative is often the function of focus of attention. 
In particular, social identity results from a narrow focus on one dimension of self that is shared 
with others. In contrast, personal identity results from the unique configuration of several, non-
redundant self-dimensions (e.g., a gay vegetarian who identifies with the Republican Party and 
loves salsa dancing). Of importance, any one of these dimensions of self could reflect personal or 
social identity, depending on focus of attention (itself determined by various personal and 
contextual factors; see Simon, 1999).   
 
This last point is important, as it moves the discussion of the relationship between 
personal and social identity from content to process (see Deaux, 1996). As noted, some (Turner 
et al., 1987; Mullen et al., 2003) maintain that the process determining personal and social 
identity salience oppose one another, such that focus on self at one level precludes focus on the 
other. In addition to the work of Mullen and colleagues, recent research by Simon, Aufderheide, 
and Hastedt (2000) supports this contention. These researchers found that members of an 
experimentally created minority group were more likely to engage in group-level information 
processing (presumably an indicator of social identity salience) than were their majority-group 
counterparts, and an experimental manipulation of personal identity salience reduced this 
discrepancy. However, the same personal identity salience manipulation increased group-level 
processing on the part of majority group members, suggesting that personal and social identity 
were simultaneously salient. Like our own findings of increased self-stereotyping for high 
identifiers who were self-focused, this moderating effect of group size challenges the assertion 
that social and personal identity salience are necessarily antagonistic. We did not measure 
personal identity salience directly in our own study, and a proxy for personal identity salience 
used in the research of Simon et al. (2000) (uniqueness as an individual) failed to covary with 
changes in group-level information processing. Clearly, further researcher is needed.  
 
Interpersonal and Intergroup Behavior 
 
Understanding the relationship between personal and social identity is important in its 
own right, but also because self-definition at these two levels is theorized to correspond to 
interpersonal and intergroup behavior, respectively (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1999; Turner et al., 
1987, Turner et al., 1994). Social identity and self-categorization theorists maintain that social 
identity salience is the causal mechanism underlying a host of group processes. At the same time, 
theorists from these traditions point out that contextual factors thought to increase the salience of 
social identities are limited to those who have some degree of subjective identification with the 
ingroup; people must accept and internalize a contextually relevant social identity in order for 
intergoup behavior to occur. If true, our findings, which indicate overlap between personal and 
social identity for high identifiers, carry an important implication for what is often assumed to be 
intergroup behavior. In particular, the theoretical distinction between these self-definitions and 
the disconnection thought to underlie interpersonal and intergroup behavior becomes more 
difficult to maintain. Our findings, along with those of others (Deschamps, 1998; Simon et al., 
2000), suggest that such sharp distinctions may be uncalled for (Simon, 1997). Determining 
when and to what extent these two self-definitions and their behavioral correlates overlap, and if 
these different levels are truly disconnected (Harrington & Miller, 1990), will be an important 
goal for future research.  
 
Notes 
 
1. In making national identity salient in all conditions, we hoped to focus participants on this and 
not other, potentially competing identifications. Mullen et al. (2003) followed a similar approach 
by asking all of their participants to indicate their ethnic group in a small box at the top of their 
questionnaire.  One consequence, of course, is that differences between conditions may be harder 
to demonstrate. 
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